A strategy to overcome the short circuit.
Column by Francesco Grillo published on the Italian newspapers Il Messaggero, Il Mattino e Il Gazzettino
Can political leaders of weak national democracies strengthen a Europe that absolutely needs to respond to problems that threaten to overwhelm it? This is the most difficult contradiction that the debate on the reform of the European Union seems to avoid. And it is a contradiction made evident by the speed with which we managed to burn the last illusion: only last Friday we greeted the meeting in Kiev of the heads of government of the three main countries of the European Union, as the historic beginning of a re-foundation of the Union. The weekend was enough to remind him that even Macron, the one who should have been the most stable of leaders who must change Europe, does not even have the necessary consensus to form a parliamentary majority in his own country. Actually, the great difficulty with which the European Union has been dealing for decades is the reflection of a deeper crisis of the democracies in the states that are part of the Union. And it is this link between crisis that must be broken with a strategy that must find a concrete landing.
It was a powerful idea in terms of symbols, to find oneself discussing how to “re-found” the European Union by traveling towards the rubble of a country that pays for its desire to be part of it. It is encouraging that Draghi, Macron and Scholz have discovered, observing the consequences of the war from a window, that they have the same ideas on how to restore vigour to a project born precisely to prevent the repetition of those barbarities. And, however, the idea of a refoundation has to deal with two important problems that we do not yet know how to solve.
The first is that there is a contradiction between the idea of enlarging the EU and that of finally making it more cohesive. It is precisely from the most recent accession countries, precisely from those bordering Ukraine (Poland, Hungary), that the most difficult problems to solve for an EU that is forced to laborious negotiations at times when speed is important comes. The second weakness that, so far, any attempt at reform has had to pay for is that of relying on leadership which, even in the largest countries and which were founders of the Union, appear inexorably transitory: even if one wanted to rely on a pact between France , Germany and Italy, it could never be "iron" because it is very difficult for the heads of government of all three countries to have sufficient political stability at the same time. What are the solutions then?
For some time now, everyone - or almost everyone - has been calling for the abolition of unanimity to avoid the paradox of having to find themselves in the situation where it is necessary to buy the consent of those who slow down everyone else. And yet, it is necessary to go beyond vague statements and give substance to the principle.
The decisions that the European Council takes are already for 80% of cases taken by qualified majority, with a mechanism that provides that the consent of 55% of the States (15 out of 27) is sufficient and in such a way that they represent 65 % of the Union population. Unanimity applies to all matters relating to common defence and almost all those having to do with policy towards third states: it is on these issues that the Commission has most recently asked - for example when it comes to deliberating sanctions or to send humanitarian expeditions or to take common positions on human rights violations - to extend the method of qualified majority.
And, however, it must be considered that almost always, even when it is not strictly necessary - for example in decisions relating to the internal market - the European Council decides without any vote against. This is because adopting a majority decision, where that decision also commits the State that is against it, can open dangerous divisions. In other words, deciding to proceed in any case with certain decisions taken at EU level, where those determinations require a commitment by the States that retain ultimate sovereignty over their own territory, over their armed forces, over their finances, can make explode the contradiction of the very nature of a Union that continues to depend on the cooperation of all its members. What is the solution then?
The idea that, sooner or later, will end with the emergence, is to open the same treaties to the hypothesis that within the European Union, it becomes physiological that parts of the Union, groups of States form much more strengthened and stable integrations among themselves by deciding to give up pieces of sovereignty. This would mean handing over power to a common management that less frequently needs to go through the consent of its governments. Such additions would be designed for specific purposes (for example, to get out of Russia's dependence on gas supplies by a certain date) and would last as long as necessary to achieve that goal.
Dimitri Medvedev, the President of the Political Party that has dominated the Russian Parliament for decades, mockingly challenged the Union a few days ago, alluding to its possible dissolution, even before Ukraine could join it. He responds to that arrogant challenge, recognizing that the Russian oligarchs force us to deal with what are our ancient contradictions. To do this we need symbols but three leaders who are on the train to observe the effects of barbarism are not enough. It is necessary to mobilize public opinion that feels that its possible future is in the Union and the pragmatism of those who are no longer satisfied with stories that last a few days.
