Three proposals for common defense
An article by Francesco Grillo for Il Messaggero
"I come from the school of realism, and that's why I believe Europe must accept that it is not going to be at the negotiating table for peace in Ukraine." These words from Keith Kellogg, a general forged in the Vietnam War and later the Iraq War, and special envoy for the U.S. President in talks between Ukraine and Russia, are striking. They serve the purpose of making Europe face the reality that it has entered an entirely new phase of history. Its strategic weakness will force it to pay the price of protecting a peace negotiated by others. But this humiliation could paradoxically become the lever that will push us to reinvent ourselves. We need ideas that can give us that "strategic autonomy" we’ve only talked about. As long as we stop making the mistake of thinking that it's all just about balancing military budgets. Because what history is really asking from us is to become a different society—one capable of defending what defines it.
It won’t be easy to find the fiscal space to increase defense spending, as Italy's Minister of Economy, Giorgetti, knows well. It's impossible, for example, to imagine tripling it as U.S. President Trump asks (raising it to 5% of GDP from the 1.5% we’re around today). It's impossible considering that countries like Italy and France have committed to reducing public spending by 0.6% per year over the next five years, and we've made this commitment without accounting for the storm clouds gathering on the horizon. The sharp slowdown in industrial production already recorded in the statistics could be worsened by the trade war sparked by Trump himself, and further amplified by the waning momentum of recovery and resilience plans (our PNRR). A step forward could be Ursula Von Der Leyen's request to exclude defense investments from the Stability Pact. However, this doesn't reduce the difficulty of responding to financial markets, which calculate deficits without applying those rules.
Finding resources is not trivial. But, in fact, at least three other major investments are needed: in strategy, in institutional reforms, and in societal attitudes. These could make the financial effort more politically acceptable.
The first investment is about defining what we really need and, therefore, how much it actually costs to defend ourselves. Today, in a context very different from the one in which the armies of countries (European ones, but not Ukraine or Russia) have not had the chance to experience real warfare. The good news is that, as the war on the Eastern front shows, today more than expensive tanks or costly jets, it's more important to equip ourselves with and deploy swarms of drones, about the size and cost of a cell phone; equipped with AI to travel autonomously and adapt to the environment; and capable of exploding (like the PAGERs used by Israelis to hit hundreds of Hezbollah militants). The bad news is that soon we may need, though costly, a research program—one that isn't impossible as the Israelis have shown—that could protect us, possibly from space, against nuclear attacks.
The second issue is setting up efficient purchasing mechanisms and defining who’s in charge in emergencies. Spending more is only valuable if we do it in a coordinated manner, eliminating redundant spending and non-integrable systems. However, Europe continues to move in the opposite direction from what it says: in 2024, the percentage of joint acquisitions of military digital technologies was lower than the previous year, before the invasion of Ukraine. Equally sensible is the French insistence on buying within Europe. It’s clear that it can't be done suddenly without the United States, but it must be established that no “strategic autonomy” will work unless we aim to become progressively autonomous. Finally, regarding the French, it must also be recognized that they are, in fact, the only EU partner with a nuclear deterrent and the only one sitting on the UN Security Council. Though this position could be diluted in a broader defense union with the UK, it should also narrow to those who are seriously committed (to avoid the leverage of members like Hungary and Slovakia).
Third, defending what we have means understanding that this isn't something you can do while sitting in an armchair or by just signing checks. It's a project that can succeed only if it involves everyone. Some are already considering reintroducing conscription (in Germany and, in Italy, with Defense Minister Crosetto); others are thinking about mandatory civil service that trains people (not just the youth, but throughout life) to defend themselves against both attacks and the various emergencies we periodically face (pandemics, earthquakes, floods…). The added value would be to rekindle the idea that we are a community. This time, European, not just national.
Keith Kellogg has the blunt pragmatism of a general. He advised us not to waste time whining about being excluded from the peace talks but to come up with ideas to regain a role. He's right—this is the moment to respond to unconventional methods with equally pragmatic ideas that make the case for considering Europe as a key player in any peace process. We just need to remember that in a world where success is driven by bold ideas, the best defense is to go on the offensive.
References
The Economist (2025) Donald Trump’s assault on Europe. Link.
POLITICO (2025) Europe splits on Trump’s call to dramatically boost defense spending. Link.
Clingendael Institute (2025) European Defence Industry: Towards Institutional Adaptation. Link.
