



SECOND TAORMINA/MESSINA CONFERENCE¹

18TH – 21ST JUNE 2021

**THE FUTURE OF EUROPE IN A POST PANDEMIC WORLD
(ORGANIZED BY VISION AND TAOBUK FESTIVAL)**

LA METAMORFOSI DI EUROPA²

THE MANIFESTO AND CONFERENCE FOLLOW UP



¹ The first day of the three days conference was hosted by the University of Messina. We thank the Rector, Professor Salvatore Cuzzocrea, the Pro Rector, Professor Giovanni Moschella, the faculty and the staff for the support.

² Europa is the mythological Phoenician princess whose seduction from JOVIS gave birth to the kingdom of CRETE and to the idea of the WEST as civilization.

WORKING GROUPS

WORKING GROUP 1. DEMOCRATICALLY ACCOUNTABLE GLOBAL DIGITAL PLATFORMS AS THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE BATTLE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY³

Coordinators: Alexandra Geese (MEP, Alliance 90/ The Greens); Jan Piotrowski (The Economist, Business Editor); Francesco Grillo (Vision)

The future belongs to global digital platforms. That sentiment is as commonplace, in Europe and elsewhere, as it is vague and uninterrogated. However, you define these multisided marketplaces, which act as conduits for data flows and virtual points of contact between physical networks, of commerce, information or interpersonal relationships, one thing is clear to European policymakers: as Justice Potter Stewart did with obscenity, they know it when they see it. And what they see is American and Chinese.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Of course, Europeans have access to non-European platforms, just as they can buy a Japanese car or an Argentine steak. European merchants sell to European shoppers on Amazon. European companies advertise to European consumers on Google and Facebook. European teenagers follow European influencers series on Tik Tok. And in a world where trade were free, globalisation on the march and competition thriving, that might be enough.

Nationality should, thus, not matter. The concern would be more about the creation by platforms of dominant positions which are, in fact, bringing us to a scenario which is the opposite to the one that the Internet promised in the first place thanks to its very characteristics of being a decentralized network. It is about a huge concentration of information and, thus, power and the impact of this is being seen across different industrial sectors (whereas old monopolies and traditional antitrust policies were meant to be mostly by industry) and different human activities (including politics).

And yet protectionist sentiments resurface, nation states reassert their power and the nationality of the platforms begins to matter. They are the 21st-century equivalent—as the Vision paper suggests—of the roads, railways and ports that helped fuel the great industrial revolutions of the past. Just as transport infrastructure enabled goods and ideas to flow between 19th-century factories, the platforms channel data, the modern day's most valuable resource, to their most productive uses.

As one participant reminded “it may still be true that GAFAM (the acronym under which Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft) may represent a rather small percentage of global GDP and global corporate revenues and yet it controls the access to a much higher percentage of data. If data is going to drive 80% of the added value on products and services in the economy by 2030,

³ The background to the WG was VISION concept paper and the conclusions of the 2020 Taormina Conference on global digital platform accessible here https://www.thinktank.vision/images/2020/Taormina_conference/WG/WG1_conclusions_.pdf

the equation is quite straightforward to call for action⁴ (and, indeed, this is confirmed by the astronomical market capitalization that are supposed to discount future value⁵)”.

That makes it jarring that the definition of the problem to be solved—and even something so seemingly fundamental as defining what a global digital platform really is⁶—remains deeply muddled among stakeholders.

From the Taormina/Messina workshop, it emerges that Europeans resigned to using non-European platforms have five main concerns. Foreign platforms:

1. could in principle cut off access to their services (and some may argue for a quasi-utility approach to services which are increasingly considered quasi-public);
2. they - certainly Chinese ones and potentially even those from America - could facilitate the pilfering of European intellectual property;
3. may be stifling European businesses that rely on them, or preventing rival European platforms from emerging (as we already mentioned);
4. could reflect, by default if not by design, the values of their home countries, which can, as with American turbo capitalism or Chinese authoritarianism, look inimical to Europe’s human-centric and rights-oriented values;
5. lastly, global digital platforms are relevant to public goods like healthcare, but also can create the conditions in which democracy itself comes under threat.

None of these worries is new. However, the global⁷ nature and reach of the platforms has amplified greatly opportunities and threats. They have been interconnected and they are reinforcing each other.

FIRST ELEMENTS FOR PROBLEM SOLVING

Vis-à-vis these perceptions Europe has, in theory, three possibilities:

1. the first is to design and promote globally an action capable to apply to data infrastructures the same original paradigm of the internet that started as a decentralized communication network;
2. the second is to “at least save Europe” which also would mean to deliberately (and more or less explicitly) “protect” our own territory (as other countries have done when strategic interests are involved);

⁴ As an example, one of the largest projects actually in the automotive field is called Catena-X, where BMW, Daimler, VW have decided to share their data to build in their cars; if these data will not be stored and managed within a EU technology platform, the risk is that the intellectual property of a big part of the future product value may be lost.

⁵ It is enough to count AMAZON (whose market cap is smaller than APPLE and Microsoft) to have a market value higher than the entire Frankfurt Stock Exchange (the largest EU stock exchange where all major German manufacturers, car makers, banks and chemical companies are listed).

⁶ Some of the participants suggest the term “new techno-infrastructures” which may better reflect the fact that the new infrastructures require certain characteristics (flexibility, federated nature, resilience, etc.) that coincide with the principles of the “Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-Based Digital Government at the ministerial meeting during the German Presidency of the Council of the European Union on 8 December 2020”.

⁷ Some argue that none of these platforms is, however, truly global. In fact, most of American ones are hard to access from China and viceversa.

3. the third is to become a standard setter for digital regulation as may already happened with GDPR.

The choice between the two approaches is not only intellectual but also political⁸.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the EU is using (or should use) three important policy levers: regulations of existing platforms; innovation policies meant to foster the participation of European companies to competition for digital leadership (so that markets become less concentrated); principles and incentives to promote technological solutions which may be consistent with EU objectives.

The three levers are, obviously, interconnected and their success largely depends on their internal consistency.

REGULATIONS AND WHOM DO WE WANT TO PROTECT?

The EU has so far focused on regulating the existing platforms and – even more tellingly – the approach has still been largely about trusting a “law based” approach (which is not the only possible option, although it is certainly the one we would expect from an institution like the EU).

This has worked to an extent. The Global Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is an illustration of the “Brussels effect”, whereby companies align their global practices on how to process personal data⁹ with rules set for the EU, the world’s largest market of wealthy consumers. European data-protection rules have indeed been transposed in many countries and they even inspired American and British¹⁰ jurisdictions.

That said, it is unclear how successfully European regulations are being or will be enforced.

The effects of GDPR may not manifest themselves fully until the platforms’ pre-GDPR data hauls become outdated and lose their value, which could take another few years. And even perfect enforcement may prove ineffectual and, worse, put up bigger barriers for upstart European platforms than for the incumbent foreign giants, which can afford large compliance departments stuffed with well-paid lawyers and which treat even billion-euro fines as a modest cost of doing business. Last but not least, the very “natural persons” may not be aware of their new rights and may not function as a powerful ally to force compliance. Simplification may here be very useful and the experimentations of different methods to make the GDPR more “user friendly” may be assessed.

Slightly different considerations may be applied to the on-going process of drafting the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

⁸ Although somebody may argue that this one of those vital questions which challenge traditional dichotomy between right/ conservatives and left/ progressives.

⁹ The EU distinguishes “personal data” (meaning by that “any information relation to an identified or identifiable natural person”) from non-personal and open data.

¹⁰ The Brussels effect seems to have had an impact even across the British Channel and beyond the BREXIT: the new digital markets unit within the Competition authority and the draft “Bill on Online Safety” appear to reflect some of the European choices.

Politics and multilateralism are the overarching constraint that lead to compromises that the European Commission is still taking to the highest possible denominator through hard work and skills. And yet a turbulent drafting process may have produced the overlapping of different policy goals (competition and consumer protection) and different methods to pursue them (regulation is meant to be ex-ante, however ex-post investigations may not be excluded). Indeed, as formulated, the proposed legislation could have effect not just on American tech giants but also on European gatekeepers, while missing many Chinese internet titans that no doubt hope to make inroads in Europe.

CORPORATE DECLINE AND EUROPEAN PLATFORMS?

Europe should, also, strive to create an environment where new European innovative companies could germinate and thrive.

The structure of European economy and innovation systems seem, in fact, to be structurally different from American and Chinese ones. Europe is much more about SMEs which even achieve leadership in their industries and, therefore, one should not be surprised for seeing so few European companies amongst the largest of the world for market capitalization (actually there is only one in the top twenty) or amongst UNICORNS (only 28 out of more than 500, according to the VISION paper).

And yet there are two trends for which a policy response would be worthwhile: a) the gradual disappearance of European multinationals from the corporate giants is a relatively new phenomenon (twenty years ago European companies accounted for more than 30% of global market capitalization; today for less than 15%): the parallel decline in the EU's share of world economy may say that a certain scale is still important to compete; b) even more worrying, if we consider the 143 companies whose market value is above 100 billion EURO, one third of them were established in the last 50 years and none is European.

There is, thus, an issue of market dynamism which needs to be greatly enhanced.

It is critical to remember that companies which today control the world's digital infrastructure were not designed by committee in Washington¹¹ or Beijing. If they then became tools of geopolitical influence, that was not their original intent. Nor, for that matter, was their global reach. Rather, they offered a service—accurate internet search, convenient socialising, easy shopping, accessible entertainment or quick payments—that appealed to users. And they created profitable business models around those services. This is true of Amazon, Google and Facebook as it is of Alibaba and Tencent. All of them also attained their gigantic size and global reach in a regulatory wild west and wild east, and might never have reached their current proportions if tight regulations had been in place.

Leaving aside the desirability of such an outcome, it does raise the question of how a European platform could ever hope to become large enough to rival the American and Chinese ones under a regulatory regime that implicitly aims to keep platform growth in check. Here, Europe has some intriguing options to spur innovation through differentiation.

¹¹ True Internet was born out in 1969 out of a "contest" promoted by the Pentagon and its special R&D unit called DARPA. Its commercial diffusion, however, was almost entirely due to private market forces.

On the private-sector side, budding European platforms could, for instance, offer safety over speed, or champion ethical and unbiased artificial intelligence. The public sector, in the EU and member states, could start by completing a single market where competition may select European companies which may big enough to reach global scope. This would enable start-ups to treat the entire EU as their addressable market rather than just their home countries—and in turn make it easier to compete with incumbent giants that have the resources to run independent operations in various EU countries. Rules for what companies and other organisations cannot do with data—which is the focus of GDPR, DMA and DSA—should be complemented with a data-governance act that would spell out how data can be used. Europeans could experiment with public-private or federated models that pool the data resources of smaller entities, as GAIA-X is striving to do for data and cloud infrastructure. Europe could even begin to think about creating self-compliant platforms.

Last but not least, consumers may even provide room for innovation: the last pandemic clearly demonstrate that very few platforms (like ZOOM or Microsoft Teams) cannot accommodate for very different needs, products and customer segments: this is especially true for key sectors like health care and education and for age groups like the elderly and primary school kids.

The important of unleashing animal spirits does not, however, get rid of an important role of public investment and, even more, of public coordination of private ones: it is critical that the EU engaged itself into a continuous update of the basic information infrastructure (Ultra-Broad-Band, 5G, ..) which is essential to promote an enough big EU market.

The problem, however, is still: how do we bring INTERNET to its initial promise whereas this implies to be able to promote an agenda which goes beyond the European Union's remit?

On the global stage, the EU should ally itself with other like-minded democracies. Europe is often rhetorically placed between America and China but it is not equidistant to each of these. Though Brussels must collaborate with Washington and Beijing, as well as other parts of the world, on issues of common concern, Europe has been and will be closer to America than to China. Recent progress on global corporate taxation at the G7 and a newfound zeal for reining in big tech in Washington suggests such an alliance is possible. Other parts of the world may also be allied: Africa, where China has occupied an European vacuum (and exports of surveillance equipment is booming) is our closest neighbourhood; however, parts of Latin America and of Asia may share an agenda for Internet that Europe may promote.

WHAT KIND OF PLATFORMS?

A third possible way would be to mix regulation and technologies and, more precisely, uses regulation (and even financial incentives) to promote technologies that appear to be more consistent with this objective. This would, thus, probably mean to favour: decentralized and interoperable technologies vs centralized non-interoperable; open standard to guarantee native compatibility and interoperability vs proprietary, non-compatible one another technologies; transparent and configurable technologies that allow users to implement their first order rules (to adapt to existing and future regulations) vs opaque, black-boxed, non-configurable technologies, with embedded self-defined access rules¹².

¹² More in general developing a backbone of EU certification technologies based on DLT (like the EBSI, a European Blockchain, and e-IDAS, the European digital identity standard) and DAO (Distributed Autonomous Organizations,

An important guideline to promote this is the Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-based Digital Government and the chapter on digital sovereignty: it promote standardization, modular architectures and open source; but also the use of the public sector, the public procurement and the need to overhaul its information systems as a leverage.

The NGEU may, in this sense, have been a missed opportunity. Some of the most sizeable Recovery and Resilience Plan (for instance the Italian one) make very little reference to the choice that the EU is making as far as technological solutions.

Europe is not a digital wasteland. Without the sophisticated chipmaking kit built by ASML, a Dutch company, the world's semiconductor companies would grind to a halt. Ericsson and Nokia compete with Huawei to equip the world with 5G mobile networks. Sweden's Spotify is the envy of the music-streaming world. European online banking and many of its fintech firms have a lot to teach Wall Street and Silicon Valley.

Europe is fundamentally no less endowed with human capital and ingenuity than any other place. Exporting European values to the world, including parts of it that look to Europe as a benevolent alternative to American or Chinese hegemony, will be easier if Europe can take advantage of this remarkable endowment.

However, we believe that we are still missing a comprehensive, coordinated (and yet flexible, pragmatic) strategy which would use the three levers - regulations of existing platforms, incentives to nurture more European companies to compete for global digital leadership, policies capable to steer markets towards more open standards and more products/ customers differentiation – different participants have suggested. We believe that more debate like the Messina/ Taormina one, from different academic and industrial backgrounds, different national cultures and even from outside the EU is key to the future.

governed by participants through distributed consensus and technological components that agree to be monitored and certified by the members of the organization)

WORKING GROUP 2: NEXT GENERATION EU AND COMPLETING THE EU HAMILTONIAN MOMENT¹³

Coordinators: Koert Debeuf (Director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy Europe and Editor in Chief, EUobserver), Nicola Saldutti (Corriere della Sera), Stefania Baroncelli (Professor Public and European Union Law at Free University of Bozen-Bolzano), Marco Maria Aterrano (Università degli Studi di Messina - docente di Storia Contemporanea)

Historically, the evolution of a distinctly European social model generated in European citizens the expectation that certain standards of living, especially in matters of health, education, life expectancy, social protection, were to be enabled by the State and the community. This *European way of life*, as defined by historian Tony Judt, while in crisis, still maintains its promise of job security, substantial social transfer payments and progressive tax rates, which represent in the eyes of most Europeans an implicit social contract between the State and its citizens.

The long-lasting health, economic and social crisis deprived Europeans of many of these certainties. In such framework, any future investment needs to be guided by the double objective of reducing the gap existing between citizens and institutions on the one hand, and granting the widest participation and involvement of people in the implementation of these projects themselves on the other. These must be the pillars for the success of Next Gen EU and similar projects that will follow in its footsteps.

THE NEXT GENERATION EU IS HERE TO STAY ..

In the unanimous opinion of the speakers from the working group, Next Gen EU should not be limited to a powerful yet transitory intervention of EU institutions, but rather be transformed into a structural mechanism in the future. Naturally, the system of common debt cannot and must not refer to pre-existing national debt from each of the member States; rather, the creation of a European common debt needs to become the core for the realization of efficient and wide-reaching EU projects. In order to make this change possible on a permanent basis, it is necessary to think about equipping the EU with more tax-raising capacity and proper constitutional adjustments (eg increase powers in the fiscal domain and involvement of the European Parliament). This will enable greater legitimacy, reduce the conflict between the EU countries and the attacks to the supremacy of EU Law (eg. progressive and frugal; Poland and Hungary). At the same time, among future goals, the scaling up of financing mechanisms and the mobilization of private capital need to be put at the center of all EU endeavours.

.. WITH SOME SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

The objective to complete the Hamiltonian moment of Europe implies, however, that the Taormina/Messina conference believes that it is not too early to start assessing the experience of the NEXT GENERATION EU together with the evaluation of more consolidated policy instruments. A number of recommendations emerge from the WG:

¹³ The background of the WG was the conference concept paper and the VISION paper on “completing EUROPE’s Hamiltonian moment” accessible at <https://www.thinktank.vision/en/magazine/the-future-of-europe/one-year-later-is-next-generation-eu-working>

1. Within the framework of the progressive transformation of common European debt from contingent to permanent, it is advisable not to overlook the existing experience of the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), which has been successful in mobilizing private investors. A mixed system of investment, part public and part private in nature, is necessary to reach the overarching objectives of the EU, as large funding schemes cannot weigh exclusively on EU budget.
2. Common debt should preferably tend to stimulate transnational investments, rather than focus solely on national projects. Additionally, it could be argued that a reasonable objective would be the articulation of a plan that incentivizes investments in local, small and medium-sized businesses with the support of the Union, so that part of the risk involved would be shared with the EU.
3. Next Gen EU provides both European and national institutions with an opportunity to bring back in the debate the idea of industrial policies considering how global value chains are being shortened and reconsidered in a post pandemic world. This would also stimulate the interaction between small, medium and big *industry*. Its overall goal must be the achievement of a new, more equitable balance between businesses and consumers.
4. The suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact, which made the activation of resources for 7 trillion Euros possible, is a temporary measure that could be reviewed and extended, so as to provide the basis for reflection on future developments. With a view on the creation of what could be defined as a *stability and resilience pact*, a central role could be played by the principle contained in art. 18 of the PNRR regulations, which requires member States to account for the involvement of civil society in the preparation and implementation of recovery plans.
5. Any modification of the stability pact would find its rationale in the Next Gen EU's satisfactory outcome. Italy's success in the implementation of the PNRR will play a fundamental part in this and some participants wished that this over exposure to the outcome in one country is not to be repeated.
6. In order to avoid interventions by national authorities that could potentially weaken the strength and momentum of the integration process, it would be advisable to make the implementation of Next Gen EU ever more unitary and cohesive, by having all actors involved subscribe to a shared set of values and principles.
7. The more recently funded projects need to take into account pre-existing development plans, according to a principle of complementarity. Further, the synergy between the different sectors of investment is also a fundamental tool for the success of Next Gen EU.
8. Every political-financial action of the EU should always be aware of the constantly evolving global trends in the field of geopolitics, technological innovation, climate change, and oppose policies that can threaten the *European way of life*.
9. Guiding principles of the European institutions' funding action should always be the strengthening of social equity and the principle of subsidiarity: it is therefore essential to favor projects that go beyond the traditional core business of nation-states and that aim to reduce economic and social inequalities between European regions and different segments of each member State's population.
10. The need to introduce more flexible governance mechanisms capable of taking into account the different speed of development and growth of each member State is becoming increasingly evident. Acknowledging this need does not imply giving up on pushing for cohesive, inclusive programs of European development, but could rather have the advantage of tying the economic growth of "slower" countries to that of "faster" ones. For this reason, the priority is to increase the spending capacity of individual countries,

proceeding to streamline their internal structures of public administration, and at the same time reinforcing integrated forms of cooperation between States.

WG 3 REPORT. THE GREAT PANDEMIC AND ADAPTING THE WELFARE AND HEALTH SYSTEMS TO THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction: Stefano Campostrini (Professore ordinario Università Ca' Foscari Venezia), Angela Giuffrida (The Guardian).

The trend that we are witnessing in Europe over the latest years, even preceding the pandemic that we have lived through, is the increased longevity of the population due to a constant decrease in mortality. The case of Italy is a prime example of this trend. The simultaneous reduction in birthrate has determined a progressive aging of the population, a circumstance that per se should determine a renewal of the healthcare and welfare systems robust enough to meet the new needs of the emerging demographic makeup.

Beyond these social-demographic ones, which are purely endogenous to the old continent, other factors that complicate the picture are tied to strongly accelerating mega-trends, such as globalization (both of the economic and non-economic types), climate change, migratory pressures (often connected to the prior two factors), and global health issues amongst which the pandemic has been only the most evident (microbial resistance, for instance, is likely to wreak havoc eventually). Another trend that raises the level of complexity and the need for new, adequate responses, is the increase of inequalities within and among several countries, a phenomenon made more acute by the pandemic. Said inequalities regard personal incomes (and more so finances) and are reflected in considerable educational, health and general wellbeing gaps.

HERE COMES THE PANDEMIC ...

If we look at the most significant Covid-19-related numbers – distribution of COVID-19 cases and deaths (as reported by the World Health Organization as of 19th July 2021) – the European Union bears a share (more than 20%) that is greater than their contribution to the world's population (less than 7%)¹⁴.

In the meantime, the 15 ASIA – OCEANIA countries which share the Pacific western shore (and just established the so called “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”) did much better: notwithstanding they host 30% of the world population (more than 2 billion people) and account for 30% of world GDP, they still suffered less COVID19 deaths than Spain alone (with less than 50 million inhabitants). And yet the fact that Spain was considered the third best healthcare systems of the world (for instance, Reuters 2020) says that we may have been missing something.

In the second phase, owing to a better vaccination campaign USA and UK have reduced the burden; initially the EU was greatly slowed down by the very decision to suddenly bring to the European level a policy which is still technically and firmly national but by July 2021 had caught up with the UK and even overtaken the USA in terms of share of the population vaccinated.

.. WHICH MEANS A GREAT RETHINKING OF THE WELFARE SUPERPOWER (AND OF THE EC'S ROLE)

¹⁴ Similar picture emerges when we consider different account for COVID-19 deaths: according to THE ECONOMIST which calculated excess deaths from all causes vis-à-vis historical averages in the pandemic months, 5 out of the 15 worst hit countries are from the EU. All Asia Pacific States recorded less deaths than normal averages during the same period.

In a similar context of constant change, it is necessary to shift the organizational paradigm in such a way that it becomes more open and responsive to research findings and innovative approaches.

1. The pandemic showed the contradiction of an area of free circulation of people which does not have in place mechanisms through which responses to a health emergency which do impact mobility, are, at least, coordinated (or centrally managed). It is an example of how half integration (like the Schengen one) may demonstrate to be sub optimal and unstable in case of crises. A European Union which is capable to face the emergencies that the 21st century is making more frequent needs provisions that guarantee efficiency and greater speed should certain disruptions happen again: this may, even, imply change to the treaties.
2. Numbers, however, say that the resilience of different national systems have been different: Germany, Denmark, Finland seemed to have done much better than Spain or Italy. This makes room for identifying benchmarks and for mutual learning based on evidence. We also encourage to better consider the case of the Asia Pacific countries which have better contained the virus: their system of testing, tracing and treating contagions is to be considered an instrument to fight emergencies and least as important as vaccines.
3. It is impossible to face, at a local or national level, issues that cut across borders (as mentioned, the different choices made with regards to the management of the pandemic created paradoxical situations, especially in areas along borders). A European regulatory system capable of managing emergencies efficiently and effectively must be put in place, since uncoordinated actions have proven to be scarcely effective.
4. Consequently, European agencies' roles must be reinforced so that they may at least coordinate and manage data sharing and research activities. If an effective reform of existing European agencies is not possible, then it would be necessary to create new ones to conduct these activities. Moreover, the pandemic has exacerbated the need to invest not only in innovations, but also in the study of processes that enable the transformation of innovation into tangible benefits for all population groups.
5. The recent pandemic crisis and the lack of medical devices and materials have highlighted how important it is to re-shore the production of these strategic products.
6. In terms of healthcare expenditure in Europe, the 3% spent on prevention compared to the 97% spent on care has proven to be absolutely inadequate and shortsighted. In light of the social-demographic changes, investing more in prevention will become a key factor in determining the sustainability of healthcare systems.
7. As far as the adoption and use of new technologies is concerned, it is fundamental to consider their inclusivity. Everyone must be able to access them so that prevention and care of the entire population can be simpler and more effective.
8. Access to care for all is another essential point: insurance coverages and the public-private mix must be regulated in such a way that no one is left behind. The root causes of health inequalities need to be addressed. Unequal access to care for some jeopardizes the health of all. Case in point is the differentialized access to anti-covid vaccines across the world is case-in-point: new and more dangerous variants of the virus have emerged as a result. This problem is connected to the issue of patent regulation, especially in the healthcare field.
9. If the struggle for universal healthcare is global, then it is necessary, symbolically, and substantially emblematic – at a European level – to guarantee minimal standards of treatment and care for all EU citizens. On the other hand, we cannot ignore that it is both a moral imperative and convenient that the vaccination campaign does reach Africa and underdeveloped countries (whereas the WHO sponsored COVAX project did fail its targets).

10. One cannot institute a “European Healthcare System” without contemplating a more complex, overarching welfare system. A “European approach to social issues” must be crafted and shared.